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Abstract Recent research has shown that visual stimuli can
influence cognitive control functions, even if subjects are
unaware of the identity of the stimuli. However, in those
previous studies, subjects actively attended to the location of
the subliminal stimuli. Here we assessed the role of endog-
enous spatial attention in such paradigms. We required sub-
jects to quickly prepare for one of two numerical judgment
tasks on the basis of the direction of motion in patches of
moving dots presented in cued spatial locations. We found
that irrelevant motion patches presented in the uncued spa-
tial locations also influenced task performance. Motion in
the uncued patches was weak and did not affect the percep-
tion of the cued patches. Further analyses suggested that the
effect of priming by the uncued stimuli was present even for
subjects who could only discriminate such stimuli at chance
level. Three additional experiments confirmed that subjects
paid minimal attention to the uncued locations, in that the
subjects could not perform simple discriminations of con-
junctions of features in those locations.
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Priming
Higher cognitive processes are traditionally thought to require
both focused attention and awareness (Jack & Shallice, 2001;
Norman & Shallice, 1986). Many recent empirical and
theoretical studies have suggested that complex behaviors,
such as cognitive control, depend on conscious attention,
such that these behaviors are unlikely to be influenced by
unconscious or unattended stimuli (Baars, 2002; Dehaene &
Naccache, 2001; Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2003; Jack &
Shallice, 2001; Umiltà, 1988).
However, despite the general notion that attention and
awareness are necessary for higher cognitive processing,
recent studies are beginning to demonstrate that in some
cases, complex behaviors can be influenced without con-
scious attention (Dehaene et al., 1998; Dijksterhuis, Bos,
Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006; Ferguson & Bargh, 2004;
Mattler, 2003; Varraine, Bonnard, & Pailhous, 2002; for
reviews, see Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Koch, 2004;
Kouider & Dehaene, 2007). More specifically, several stud-
ies have found that cognitive control functions associated
with the prefrontal cortex can be influenced by stimuli that
can only be identified at chance level (we will call these
stimuli “subliminal” henceforth, even though they were
often not strictly subliminal in the sense that subjects could
not detect their presence; instead, their identity was
subliminal).
Lau and Passingham (2007) and Mattler (2003) showed
that subliminal stimuli can influence task selection and
preparation, one of the highest forms of cognitive control
function (Koechlin, Ody, & Kouneiher, 2003; Miller &
Cohen, 2001) known to depend on activity in the prefrontal
cortex (Sakai & Passingham, 2003). In Lau and Passing-
ham’s study, the researchers asked subjects to perform a
semantic or a phonological task, depending on whether an
instruction figure was a diamond or a square. The instruc-
tion figure acted as a metacontrast mask for a previously
presented unconscious prime that was itself either a dia-
mond or a square. Subjects’ performance decreased when
they were primed to perform the “wrong” task—that is, the
task that they were not explicitly instructed to perform. This
priming effect was found to be associated with task-specific
activity in the prefrontal cortex; in particular, subjects
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Furthermore, van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, Fahrenfort, Scholte,
and Lamme (2008) showed that inhibitory control, another
form of higher cognitive control, could be influenced by
stimuli presented below the threshold of conscious percep-
tion. The researchers demonstrated that metacontrast-
masked unconscious no-go signals increased reaction times
(RTs) and led to higher percentages of response termina-
tions. In addition, electroencephalographic recordings
showed that the no-go signal produced activations in the
prefrontal cortex. These activations were found to be re-
sponsible for the inhibitory control and independent of the
visual processing of the stimulus.
Two more studies from the same group further demon-
strated the power of subliminal stimuli to influence cogni-
tive control functions. Van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, van den
Wildenberg, and Lamme (2009) found that subliminal stop
signals decreased response speed. This effect was particu-
larly strong for the subjects who were best able to inhibit
their action when given a consciously perceived stop signal.
Finally, van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, Scholte, and Lamme
(2010) demonstated that subliminal no-go signals exert in-
hibitory control by activating prefrontal regions such as the
inferior frontal cortex and presupplementary motor area that
themselves correlate with the slowing down of RTs.
Taken together, these studies provide strong evidence that
subliminal stimuli can influence cognitive control. Howev-
er, in the studies mentioned above (Lau & Passingham,
2007; Mattler, 2003; van Gaal et al., 2008; van Gaal et al.,
2010; van Gaal et al., 2009) the invisible primes were
presented in the same spatial location as the target, and thus
subjects actively attended to the location of the primes.
Thus, it remains unclear whether stimuli that do not receive
spatial attention can produce the same effect.
It is widely assumed that certain kinds of priming are
impossible without attention (Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache,
Sackur, & Sergent, 2006; Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007). For
example, it is widely thought that visual stimuli are pro-
cessed in parallel in early visual areas, but that only attended
stimuli are able to go through an attentional bottleneck and
influence higher cognitive areas such as the prefrontal cor-
tex (Lachter, Forster, & Ruthruff, 2004; Wolfe & Horowitz,
2004). Some researchers have specifically argued that unat-
tended stimuli can be processed in early visual areas but
cannot reach areas that code for the semantic properties of
objects (Lachter et al., 2004). Evidence for such conclusions
comes from various studies in which subjects have failed to
identify words or letters without focused attention (Besner,
Risko, & Sklair, 2005; Lachter et al., 2004; Marzouki,
Grainger, & Theeuwes, 2007).
Here we demonstrate that priming of cognitive control is
possible without focused top-down attention. We presented
motion primes that were outside the focus of attention. To
anticipate the results, we found that the primes influenced
task preparation and execution, suggesting that endogenous
spatial attention may not be necessary for the priming of
cognitive control.
Experiment 1
We investigated whether subliminal stimuli outside of the
focus of attention can influence higher-order cognitive func-
tions. To this end, we placed the primes in the periphery,
rather than at fixation, and cued subjects to attend to loca-
tions away from the primes.
Most previous studies on subliminal influences on higher
cognitive functions have used color or simple geometric
forms (Lau & Passingham, 2007; van Gaal et al., 2008;
van Gaal et al., 2010; van Gaal et al., 2009). However, such
stimuli might not be optimized for processing in the periph-
ery (McMullen, MacSween, & Collin, 2009; Moreland,
Jameson, & Hurvich, 1972). Therefore, we decided to use
motion stimuli, since the presence of motion improves vi-
sion for stimuli presented peripherally (Finlay, 1982) and
thus increases the chances of finding priming from periph-
eral stimuli.
Method
Subjects A group of 21 students from the Columbia Univer-
sity undergraduate population (11 women, 10 men; mean age
0 22.4 years, range 0 18–30) participated in this experiment
and were paid $10 for approximately 1 h of participation.
Two of the subjects were excluded because they responded to
the tasks in the main part of the experiment almost complete-
ly randomly. All subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision and had signed an informed-consent statement. The
research was approved by Columbia University’s Committee
for the Protection of Human Subjects.
Materials and procedure Four black circles (0.04 cd/m
2,
visual angle 0 2.5 deg) were presented in the four quadrants
of the screen with the center of each circle located 4.6 deg
away from fixation (Fig. 1). This configuration was chosen
in order to minimize eye movements, as has been done in
previous studies (Bahrami, Lavie, & Rees, 2007). White (27
cd/m
2) arrows pointed along one of the two diagonals. The
stimuli were presented on a dark blue background (2.5 cd/
m
2). Subjects were seated in a dimmed room about 50 cm
away from the computer monitor and instructed to maintain
fixation on a central red dot (6.6 cd/m
2) displayed on top of
the white arrow for the duration of each trial. Stimuli were
generated using Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997)i n
MATLAB (The MathWorks, Natick, MA) and were shown
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1,200 pixel resolution, 60-Hz refresh rate) that produced
no blurring of the motion stimuli.
The trials in the main task of the experiment began with
350 ms of fixation, followed by a 500-ms presentation of the
four circles. White arrows randomly cued one of the diago-
nals on each trial. The arrows were presented simultaneous-
ly with the circles and remained on screen for the full 500
ms of the presentation. Within each circle were moving
white dots (density 0 2.4 dots/deg
2, speed 0 9 deg/s) with
varying levels of coherence. During the first 100 ms of the
presentation, the dots in the cued diagonal moved randomly
(coherence 0 0%) and subsequently moved with a coherence
predetermined (see below) for each subject for 400 ms. The
dots in the uncued diagonal always had a coherence of 4%,
which was found to produce performance around chance
level in a pilot study. Subjects were instructed to pay atten-
tion to the direction of the overall motion of the dots in the
cued diagonal and to disregard the motion in the uncued
diagonal.
The presentation of the moving dots was immediately
followed by a single-digit number (height 0 6.6 deg of
visual angle) presented at fixation. Depending on the direc-
tion of motion of the dots in the cued diagonal, subjects
needed to do one of two tasks. If the direction of motion was
upward, subjects needed to compare the magnitude of the
subsequent number with 5 (larger or smaller); if the direc-
tion was downward, they needed to indicate whether the
number was odd or even. The “A” key was used to indicate
that numbers were less than 5 or odd, while the “L” key was
used for numbers that were greater than 5 or even. The digit
5 was never presented. Feedback was given for wrong
answers in the form of a large red “X” (height 0 6.6 deg
of visual angle). The numbers 1, 3, 6, and 8 required the
same motor response, regardless of the direction of the dot
motion; therefore, we refer to these numbers as “no-con-
flict” numbers. On the other hand, the numbers 2, 4, 7, and 9
required different motor responses depending on the direc-
tion of the dot motion, and are thus referred to as “conflict”
numbers. On two-thirds of the trials, the subsequent number
was chosen randomly from the conflict numbers, and on
one-third of the trials, it was chosen randomly from the no-
conflict numbers. Subjects were encouraged to answer as
quickly as possible but without compromising accuracy.
The experiment began with a calibration procedure that
ensured that subjects clearly saw the direction of the motion
in the cued diagonal. Subjects first experienced a coherence
level of 25% in the cued diagonal and were required to
complete 50 trials, indicating only the direction of the mo-
tion in that diagonal. If their performance was lower than
90% correct, the coherence level was increased in incre-
ments of 5% until the subject reached a performance of 90%
correct or better (in 50 trials). This obtained value for the
coherence level was used in the rest of the experiment. For
two of the subjects, 25% coherence was used, and a visibil-
ity test was performed at the end of the experiment to
confirm that they could clearly see the motion in the cued
diagonal. The resulting mean coherence for all subjects was
33.3%; the range was 25% to 65%.
The main part of the experiment consisted of 800 trials
separated into four runs. Each run consisted of four blocks
of 50 trials. The directions of motion in both diagonals were
randomized on each trial and thus were independent of each
other. This resulted in the motion in the cued diagonal being
the same as the motion in the uncued diagonal on approx-
imately half of the trials. We call these trials “congruent,”
while the trials on which the two directions were opposite
we call “incongruent.” We predicted shorter RTs and higher
accuracy for congruent than for incongruent trials, and thus
used one-tailed paired t tests to test these predictions.
To test the extent to which the subjects were conscious of
the direction of motion in the uncued diagonal, we per-
formed one simple task at the end of the experiment, which
we refer to as the “visibility test.” Subjects were presented
with the same trial presentation as in the calibration proce-
dure and in the main part of the experiment, but this time
they needed to report first the direction of motion in the cued
diagonal and then the direction of motion in the uncued
diagonal. Subjects completed 100 trials of this test. It should
Fig. 1 Experimental procedure. Each trial began with 350 ms of
fixation. This was followed by 100 ms in which the dots in the cued
diagonal moved randomly, while the dots in the uncued diagonal had a
coherence of 4%. Then, for 400 ms the dots in the cued diagonal
moved with a subject-specific coherence that was clearly visible to
subjects (mean coherence 0 33%), while the dots in the uncued diag-
onal kept the same coherence of 4%. Each trial ended with the presen-
tation of a single-digit number until a response was provided. Subjects
needed to indicate whether the number was greater or less than 5 if the
cued motion was upward, and to indicate whether the number was odd
or even if the cued motion was downward
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main part of the experiment, the motion in the uncued
diagonal was completely irrelevant to the task and subjects
were instructed to ignore it, while in the visibility test,
subjects were encouraged to pay attention to both diagonals.
Therefore, it was likely that subjects’ performance at indi-
cating the direction of motion in the uncued diagonal in the
visibility test would overestimate their level of awareness of
the motion in that diagonal during the main part of the
experiment.
Results and discussion
In order to minimize the effects of trials with extreme RTs,
we excluded trials with RTs below 250 ms or above 8 s
(resulting in 1% of trials being excluded) and used median
rather than mean RTs in our analyses.
We tested whether the RTs and the proportions of correct
answers differed between the congruent and incongruent
trials (i.e., trials on which the cued and uncued motions
were in the same or in different directions, respectively). A
paired-samples t test showed that subjects’ accuracy was
higher on congruent than on incongruent trials [t(18) 0
2.67, p 0 .008, one-tailed t test; Fig. 2]. Another paired-
samples t test showed that the subjects’ RTs on the congru-
ent trials were significantly shorter than those on the incon-
gruent trials [t(18) 0 2.06, p 0 .027, one-tailed t test]. The
test on RTs became marginally significant if we used a two-
tailed t test (p 0 .054), but we felt that a one-tailed test was
more appropriate because of our clear prediction. Taken
together, the results on accuracy and RT showed that sub-
jects’ performance was influenced by the motion that was
outside the focus of their spatial attention.
However, one could argue that these effects were due to
the subjects getting perceptually distracted by the incongru-
ent motion in the uncued diagonal. To rule out this possi-
bility, we analyzed the data from the calibration procedure
(i.e., the initial stage of the experiment in which we deter-
mined the level of motion coherence for each subject). We
found that the uncued motion, regardless of whether it was
congruent to the cued motion, did not affect the accuracy in
discriminating the cued motion (p > .1). Similarly, we ana-
lyzed the data from the visibility test (i.e., the 100-trial
procedure performed after the main task in which we ex-
plicitly tested for the visibility of the uncued motion
patches). Again, we found no significant difference in accu-
racy for indicating the direction of motion on the cued
diagonal, regardless of whether the uncued motion was
congruent or incongruent with the cued motion.
Further analysis of the results from the main task of the
experiment also suggested that the priming from the uncued
stimuli was unlikely to operate at a perceptual level. Specif-
ically, we tested whether the incongruency effect reported
above was bigger for the trials on which both task sets
required the same keypress (no-conflict trials) or the trials
on which the two task sets required different keypresses
(conflict trials). If our subjects were simply distracted per-
ceptually by the incongruent uncued motion, one might
expect the decreases in accuracy from congruent to incon-
gruent trials to be the same for conflict and no-conflict trials.
A repeated measures analysis of variance with the factors
Stimulus Congruency and Response Conflict showed an
interaction between response conflict and stimulus congru-
ency, such that the difference in subjects’ accuracies on
congruent and incongruent trials was significantly bigger
for conflict than for no-conflict numbers [F(1, 18) 0 6.3, p
0 .02]. A similar test for RTs did not show significant
results. However, since the no-conflict trials did not neces-
sarily require the processing of the cued motion (one could
do the number task even without knowing which task he or
she was supposed to do), the above analysis cannot conclu-
sively rule out the possibility that the uncued stimuli led to
perceptual distraction. Nevertheless, taken together, the
analyses of the calibration procedure, the visibility test,
Fig. 2 Experiment 1: Reaction times (RTs) and d' for trials in which
the uncued motion was congruent or incongruent with the motion in
the cued diagonal. Left panel: RTs for congruent trials were signifi-
cantly shorter than those for incongruent trials (p 0 .027). Right panel:
d' was significantly higher for congruent than for incongruent trials (p
< .01). These data suggest that the uncued motion primed subjects’ task
sets. Error bars are within-subjects standard errors of the means
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effect was likely to act via higher cognitive processes such
as task preparation or response processing, rather than via
low-level perceptual processes.
Next, we tested whether our subjects were aware of the
direction of motion in the uncued diagonal. We found that
subjects were poor at indicating the direction of motion in
the uncued diagonal during the visibility test (d' 0 0.27) but
were nevertheless significantly better than chance (p < .05;
chance level: d' 0 0). Therefore, in order to test whether the
uncued motion could influence subjects even in the absence
of awareness, we performed a median split of the subjects in
terms of their d's in the visibility test and analyzed the half
with lower d's. These 9 subjects were at chance when
discriminating the direction of motion in the uncued diago-
nal during the visibility test (mean d' 0 −0.04, p 0 .81).
Despite that, these subjects were still significantly faster on
congruent than on incongruent trials [t(8) 0 1.99, p 0 .04],
providing some evidence that unconscious stimuli outside of
the focus of spatial visual attention can still influence task
set. We obtained similar results when we excluded all sub-
jects with positive d's or all subjects with performance better
than 55% on the visibility test (both ps < .05).
To provide a further test as to whether the effect we
observed was likely to hold for uncued stimuli that could
only be identified at chance level, we performed an analysis
developed by Greenwald, Draine, and Abrams (1996). We
analyzed the magnitude of the RT effect in the main part of
the experiment as a function of performance on the prime
perceptibility task in the visibility test (Fig. 3). We per-
formed a linear fit and excluded 2 subjects who emerged
as significant outliers (Barnett & Lewis, 1994). The zero-
intercept on the y-axis of the linear fit was significantly
positive (intercept 0 14.9 ms, p < .05), suggesting that even
when subjects were at chance in determining the direction of
motion in the uncued diagonal, that motion still had a
significant effect on task set. Not excluding the 2 outliers
led to an even higher intercept value (20.6 ms); however,
their inclusion increased the variance of the estimate of the
intercept by 70%.
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 suggested that weak stimuli that are outside of
the focus of attention can still influence such higher cogni-
tive functions as task setting. However, one could argue that
even though subjects were instructed not to attend to the
uncued diagonal, they nevertheless did so. This was unlikely
for several reasons. First, we explicitly instructed subjects
not to attend to the uncued motion patches. Second, these
motion patches were irrelevant to the subjects’ task, so
devoting attentional resources to their processing could only
hurt performance. Third, the uncued stimuli were weak and
therefore could attract only limited exogenous attention.
Nevertheless, since establishing that subjects did not pay
focused attention to the uncued stimuli was central to Ex-
periment 1, we decided to further investigate this issue. To
this end, in Experiment 2 we required subjects to perform
the task from Experiment 1 but changed the stimuli in the
uncued locations. Rather than weak motion, we used red–
greed and green–red disks (see Fig. 4a and b). It has previ-
ously been demonstrated that processing of such stimuli
requires spatial attention (Lee, Koch, & Braun, 1999; Li,
VanRullen, Koch, & Perona, 2002). In particular, Li et al.
presented these stimuli in the periphery while subjects were
performing a task at fixation. The researchers found that
subjects were at chance at discriminating between the two
kinds of disks, while they were able to discriminate well
between pictures that contained faces or animals.
Given that such colored disks have been shown to require
focused attention to be processed (Li et al., 2002), these
stimuli provide an opportunity for us to test the level of
attention deployed to the uncued diagonal in Experiment 1.
If subjects indeed paid focused attention to the uncued
locations, they should be able to discriminate between
red–green and greed–red disks when these are placed in
the uncued diagonal. On the other hand, if subjects were
not able to pay substantial attention to the uncued stimuli,
they should be at chance at discriminating the colored disks.
In Experiment 2, we adjudicated between these two possi-
bilities. To anticipate, we found that subjects were at chance
at identifying the colored disks when simultaneously
performing the task from Experiment 1, but they were able
to identify the disks when they paid focused attention to
them (without doing a concurrent task).
Fig. 3 Experiment 1: Magnitude of the reaction time (RT) effect as a
function of performance on the direct measure of prime perceptibility.
Each point on the scatterplot represents an individual subject. The
central line is the best linear fit with 90% confidence intervals. The
zero-intercept was significantly positive (p < .05), indicating that even
when the primes could only be identified at chance level, there was still
a significant effect on task preparation
Atten Percept Psychophys (2012) 74:521–532 525Method
Subjects A group of 10 students from the Columbia Uni-
versity undergraduate population (6 women, 4 men; mean
age 0 20.5 years, range 0 18–27) participated in this exper-
iment and were paid $10 for approximately 1 h of partici-
pation. One of the subjects had participated in Experiment 1
as well. All subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision and had signed an informed-consent statement.
Materials and procedure The main task was the same as in
Experiment 1. However, rather than moving dots, the
uncued circles now contained red–green or green–red disks
(Fig. 4b). Each of the uncued circles from Experiment 1 was
replaced by a single colored disk, so the overall the presen-
tation included two colored disks, one in each of two diag-
onally opposite quadrants of the screen. We designed this
experiment according to the paradigm developed by Li,
VanRullen, Koch, and Perona (2002), in which the research-
ers established that little attention was paid to a peripheral
location when a demanding central task was presented. The
colored disks were vertically separated into two regions of
different colors. On half of the trials, the left region was
green, and on the other half the left region was red. These
stimuli were forward and backward masked by a pie sepa-
rated into four quadrants (Fig. 4a). The mask had one of two
possible configurations. In one configuration, the first and
third quadrants of the mask were green and the second and
fourth quadrants were red. In the other configuration, the
first and third quadrants were red and the second and fourth
quadrants were green. The configurations of the forward and
backward masks were randomly chosen on each trial, so
about half of the time they were the same and half of the
time they were different.
The experiment started with a brief training with what we
called the “color task.” Subjects were asked to attend to the
two colored disks that appeared in the otherwise uncued
diagonal and indicate whether the two disks had the same
configuration or not (same–different task). For example, if
one of the disks was green–red (left part green, right part
red), the subjects needed to indicate “same” if the other disk
was also green–red and “different” if the other disk was red–
greed. The duration of the presentation of the colored disks
was adjusted for each subject individually so that they could
Fig. 4 Experiment 2: Task and results. (a) The task used in Experi-
ment 2 was very similar to that used in Experiment 1, with the
difference that in the uncued locations we presented colored stimuli
with no motion. The colored stimuli were red–green circles, masked by
colored pie circles with alternating colors. The durations of the stimuli
were chosen individually for the same subject, but the forward and
backward masks had equal durations that always produced a total
duration of 500 ms for the stimulus presentation. (b) The stimuli placed
in the uncued diagonal are shown. Subjects’ task was to disregard the
masks to indicate whether or not the two circles placed in the uncued
locations had the same configuration (i.e., whether the left sides of the
circles had the same color). We used these stimuli because it had
previously been shown that their identification requires attention (Lee
et al., 1999; Li et al., 2002). (c) Subjects were able to perform the task
on the uncued color stimuli when they paid undivided attention to
them, as indicated by the “single task” bar. However, when subjects
were required to simultaneously perform the number task from Exper-
iment 1, their performance was not better than chance (“dual task” bar),
suggesting that the number task does not leave attentional resources
available to “spill” to the uncued locations
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ferent task (mean duration 0 240 ms). The forward and
backward masks had equal lengths so that the whole presen-
tation was 500 ms (mean duration of each mask 0 130 ms).
The experiment proceeded with a calibration procedure
that was the same as in Experiment 1. This procedure
identified the proportion of coherent moving dots for
each subject and ensured that subjects could correctly
identify the direction of motion in the cued diagonal on
at least 90% of trials.
Finally, the main task was similar to the one in Experi-
ment 1: Subjects needed to do the number task on the basis
of the direction of motion in the cued diagonal. However, in
this experiment we asked subjects to complete the same–
different task right after indicating their answer on the
number task. In other words, subjects were completing a
dual task. This part of the experiment consisted of 400 trials
separated into four blocks of 100 trials. We analyzed the
performance on the same–different task in this part of the
experiment to test whether subjects had attentional resources
that “spilled” to the uncued diagonal.
Results and discussion
As in Experiment 1, we minimized the effects of trials with
extreme RTs by excluding those with RTs below 250 ms or
above 8 s (resulting in 2% of trials excluded) and using
median rather than mean RTs in our analyses.
We first tested whether there were significant differences
between Experiments 1 and 2 in the main task. Subjects
were able to judge the direction of motion in the cued
diagonal equally well in the two experiments [t(27) 0 0.04,
p 0 .97]. Furthermore, they performed equally well on the
number task [t(27) 0 0.24, p 0 .81]. The only difference
came from the RTs, which were higher in Experiment 2
(mean RT 0 1.36 s) than in Experiment 1 (mean RT 0
0.84 s) [t(27) 0 3.31, p 0 .003]. This difference was to be
expected, given that in Experiment 2 subjects were
performing a dual task and in Experiment 1 they were
supposed to ignore the uncued stimuli and perform a single
task on the basis of the cued motion.
We then turned to testing the main effect of interest. Not
surprisingly, subjects were able to indicate whether the two
disks were the same or different in the color task when they
paid attention to the disks and ignored the coherent motion
[t(9) 0 7.68, p < .0001; see Fig. 4c]. Critically, subjects were
not able to distinguish between the colored disks in the main
task of the experiment, where they were concurrently
performing the same number task from Experiment 1 [mean
accuracy 0 53.8% correct; t(9) 0 1.53, p 0 .16]. The fact that
RTs for the number task were significantly higher in this
experiment as compared to Experiment 1 shows that sub-
jects were actively engaging with the second task and that
their chance performance was not due to ignoring that task.
In other words, the number task was so attentionally de-
manding that subjects were unable to do a task in the uncued
diagonal known to require focused attention (Lee et al.,
1999; Li et al., 2002), even when they were actively
attempting to perform well on both tasks.
Experiment 3
The results of Experiment 2 suggested that in the paradigm
from Experiment 1, subjects were unlikely to have been able
to pay focused attention to the uncued stimuli. This conclu-
sion is strengthened by the fact that unlike the uncued
motion in Experiment 1, the colored disks in Experiment 2
were task relevant. This means that in Experiment 1 the best
strategy for subjects was to ignore the uncued motion, while
in Experiment 2 subjects’ best strategy was to try to pay
some attention to the colored disks. In other words, subjects
probably paid more endogenous attention to the colored
disks than to the uncued motion, yet this was insufficient to
perform the simple task of identifying the red–green discs.
Nevertheless, it could be argued that the static disks in
Experiment 2 might not have attracted exogenous attention
as much as the uncued moving dots in Experiment 1
(Jonides, 1981). Therefore, to control for the amount of
exogenous attention attracted by the stimuli in the uncued
diagonal, in Experiment 3 we placed motion stimuli in the
uncued locations. As in Experiment 2, we asked subjects to
complete a same–different task based on the colors red and
green; here, we used red and green moving dots and had
subjects identify the direction of motion for each color. To
anticipate, we found that the subjects were able to identify
the motion direction of the colored dots when they paid
focused attention to them; however, when subjects were
simultaneously engaged in the main task from Experiment
1, performance for the colored dots fell to chance level.
Method
Subjects A group of 9 students from the Columbia Univer-
sity undergraduate population (5 women, 4 men; mean age
0 22.9 years, range 0 18–30) participated in these experi-
ment and were paid $10 for approximately 1 h of participa-
tion. One of the subjects had participated in Experiments 1
and 2, and another had participated in Experiment 2. All
subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and had
signed an informed-consent statement.
Materials and procedure The main task was the same as in
Experiments 1 and 2. As in Experiment 2, we asked subjects
to do a second task right after completing the number task.
However, instead of masked red–green disks, we presented
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(Fig. 5a and b). The motion had exactly the same parameters
as the motion in Experiments 1 and 2 (density 0 2.4 dots/
deg
2, speed 0 9 deg/s). The red dots could occupy either the
left or the right side of the disk and moved either up or
down. The green dots occupied the other side and moved in
the opposite direction. The side and direction of motion of
the red dots were chosen randomly for each of the two
circles on each trial. Subjects’ task was to indicate whether
the red dots were moving in the same direction in the two
circles located in the uncued diagonal. The dots were pre-
sented for the full 500 ms, and unlike in Experiment 2,w e
did not mask the colored stimuli. Instead, we adjusted the
coherence of the moving dots for each subject individually
so that the subjects were able to accurately perform the
same–different task at least 70% of the time (mean coher-
ence 0 29%).
Everything else in this experiment was similar to Exper-
iment 2. Briefly, the experiment began with a brief training
with what we called the “color task,” in which the coherence
of the colored dots was adjusted for each subject
individually. We proceeded with the calibration procedure
that ensured that subjects could correctly identify the direc-
tion of motion in the cued diagonal on at least 90% of trials.
Finally, the main task was the same as in Experiment 2. The
subjects needed to do the number task on the basis of the
direction of motion in the cued diagonal and to complete the
same–different task right after indicating their answer on the
number task. This part of the experiment consisted of 400
trials separated into four blocks of 100 trials.
Results and discussion
As in Experiments 1 and 2, we minimized the effects of
trials with extreme RTs by excluding trials with RTs below
250 ms or above 8 s (resulting in 2% of trials excluded) and
using median rather than mean RTs in our analyses.
As in Experiment 2, we tested whether any significant
differences appeared between Experiments 1 and 3 in the
maintask.ThedifferencesmirroredtheonesfromExperiment
2. Comparing Experiments 1 and 3, we found that subjects
were able to judge the direction of motion in the cued
Fig. 5 Experiments 3 and 4: Task and results. (a) We used identical
stimuli for Experiments 3 and 4. The task was similar to that of
Experiment 2, except that the colored circles now had moving red
and green dots substituted for them. (b) We have zoomed in on the
stimulus presented in the uncued locations. The left half of the circle
contained green or red dots that moved either up or down. The right
side of the stimulus contained dots of the other color that moved in the
opposite direction. Subjects needed to indicate whether or not the red
dots moved in the same direction in the two uncued circles. (c) Results
from Experiment 3. When performed in isolation, the same–different
task on the colored dot motion was manageable for the subjects, who
performed at about 78% correct (“single task” bar). However, when
subjects were required to concurrently perform the number task from
Experiment 1, performance dropped to chance level (“dual task” bar).
(d) Results from Experiment 4. This experiment was identical to
Experiment 3, except that the two tasks (see panel a) were presented
in random order, such that on about half of the trials subjects were
asked about the uncued stimuli first. Subjects were again good at the
same–different task when they did not need to perform the number
task, but dropped to chance level in the main task of the experiment.
These results suggest that there was little spill of attentional resources
to the uncued location during the main task of Experiment 1
528 Atten Percept Psychophys (2012) 74:521–532diagonal equally well in the two experiments [t(26) 0 0.53,
p 0 .60], and they performed equally well on the number
task for both [t(26) 0 1.08, p 0 .29]. The only difference
camefromtheRTs,whichwerehigherinExperiment3 (mean
RT 0 1.21 s) than in Experiment 1 (mean RT 0 0.84 s) [t(26)
0 2.51, p 0 .02]. As in Experiment 2, this difference was to
be expected, given that subjects were performing a dual task
in Experiment 3 and a single task in Experiment 1.
Critically, subjects were able to indicate whether the
patterns of color motion were the same in the two circles
or different (i.e., whether or not the red dots moved in the
same direction) when they attended only to these stimuli [t
(8) 0 11.68, p < .0001]. However, when subjects were
required to simultaneously perform the number task, they
were no longer able to identify the colored motion [mean
accuracy 0 50.98% correct; t(8) 0 0.91, p 0 .38; see Fig. 5c].
It should be noted that the weak motion in Experiment 1
(coherence 0 4%) had much lower coherence than did the
colored moving dots (mean coherence 0 29%, SD 0 10%),
and thus should have attracted less exogenous attention. In
other words, Experiment 3 provided a conservative control
for the amounts of both endogenous and exogenous atten-
tion devoted to the uncued locations. Nevertheless, the
results still showed that even when subjects were paying
more exogenous and endogenous attention to the uncued
stimuli (in Exp. 3), this attention was still not enough to
complete at a better-than-chance level a task that critically
depended on attention. This suggests that the uncued stimuli
in Experiment 1 were indeed operating in the near absence
of attention.
Experiment 4
Experiments 2 and 3 suggested that in the paradigm in
Experiment 1, subjects were unlikely to have been able to
pay focused attention to the uncued stimuli. Both experi-
ments provided conservative tests for this conclusion since,
unlike the uncued motion in Experiment 1, the colored
stimuli in Experiments 2 and 3 were task relevant.
Nevertheless, one remaining concern is that the influence
of the uncued stimuli might have been present at the time
when the subjects completed the number task but could have
vanished by the time they were answering the same–differ-
ent question on the colored stimuli. Thus, if the influence of
the colored stimuli was short-lived, subjects could have
performed the same–different task at a chance level even
though they potentially had processed the stimuli enough to
perform better than chance if asked about the stimuli before
the presentation of the number task. To test for this possi-
bility, in Experiment 4 we used the same design as in
Experiment 3 but randomized the order of the number task
and the same–different task on the colored stimuli. To
anticipate, we found that subjects were still at chance on
the same–different task, even though it came before the
number question on half of the trials.
Method
Subjects A group of 9 students from the Columbia Univer-
sity undergraduate population (3 women, 6 men; mean age
0 26.7 years, range 0 20–39) participated in these experi-
ment and were paid $10 for approximately 1 h of participa-
tion. No subject had participated in any of Experiments 1–3.
All subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and
signed an informed-consent statement.
Materials and procedure The stimulus presentation was
identical to that in Experiment 3. We employed the moving
red- and green-dot pattern in the uncued locations (Fig. 5a).
To summarize, the experiment began with training of the
“color task,” in which the coherence of the colored dots was
adjusted to achieve performance of at least 70% accuracy.
We proceeded with the calibration procedure that ensured
that subjects could correctly identify the direction of motion
in the cued diagonal on at least 90% of trials. The main task
was the same as in Experiments 1–3. Subjects needed to do
the number task on the basis of the direction of motion in the
cued diagonal and to complete the same–different task.
Critically, the order of these two tasks was randomized in
order to test whether subjects would be able to perform a
task on the colored stimuli without a delay between the
stimuli and the task.
Results and discussion
As in Experiments 1–3 we minimized the effects of trials
with extreme RTs by excluding trials with RTs below 250
ms and above 8 s (resulting in 6.4% excluded trials) and
using median rather than mean RTs in our analyses.
As in Experiments 2 and 3, we tested whether there were
significant differences between Experiments 1 and 4 in the
main task. Comparing Experiments 1 and 4, we found that
the coherence of the cued motion was similar across the two
experiments [t(26) 0 0.17, p 0 .86] and that subjects were
able to judge the direction of motion in the cued diagonal
equally well in the two experiments [t(26) 0 0.34, p 0 .74].
However, subjects performed worse on the number task in
Experiment 4 (average d' 0 1.71) than in Experiment 1
(average d' 0 2.8) [t(26) 0 2.48, p 0 .02], and their RTs
were higher in Experiment 4 (mean RT 0 1.08 s) than in
Experiment 1 (mean RT 0 0.84 s), with this difference
approaching significance [t(26) 0 1.91, p 0 .07]. As in
Experiments 2 and 3, this difference was to be expected,
given that subjects were performing a dual task in Experi-
ment 4 and a single task in Experiment 1.
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er the patterns of color motion were the same in the two
circles (i.e., whether or not the red dots moved in the same
direction) when they attended only to these stimuli [t(8) 0
5.43, p < .0001]. However, when subjects were required to
simultaneously perform the number task, they were no lon-
ger able to identify the colored motion [mean accuracy 0
53.08% correct; t(8) 0 1.54, p 0 .16; see Fig. 5d], despite the
fact that on half of the trials the question about the colored
stimuli came immediately after presentation of the stimuli.
As in Experiment 3, the weak motion in Experiment 1
(coherence 0 4%) had much lower coherence than did that
of the colored moving dots (mean coherence 0 32%, SD 0
7%), and thus should have attracted less exogenous atten-
tion. In other words, Experiment 4 provided a conservative
control for the amounts of both endogenous and exogenous
attention devoted to the uncued locations.
General discussion
We investigated the influence of subliminal stimuli on
higher cognitive processes in the near absence of spatial
attention. We demonstrated that stimuli (i.e., moving
dots) outside of the attentional focus could influence
task preparation and execution, one of the highest forms
of cognitive control known to depend on the prefrontal
cortex. The effect was present even when we interpo-
lated the point at which subjects were only able to
identify the uncued stimuli at chance level. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first demonstration that
subliminal stimuli outside of the focus of endogenous
spatial attention can influence cognitive control.
Our results are at odds with several influential theories
about attention and consciousness (Dehaene et al., 2006;
Jack & Shallice, 2001; Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007; Norman
& Shallice, 1986). In particular, Koch and Tsuchiya created
a taxonomy of behaviors that are possible without attention
and/or consciousness. In their taxonomy, priming is placed
among processes that do not require consciousness but do
require attention. Our results challenge this placement and
suggest that priming should be among the processes that do
not require either consciousness or focused attention. In a
competing taxonomy, Dehaene et al. (2006) suggested that
events can be divided into conscious, preconscious, and
subliminal. According to that taxonomy, our stimuli
would be subliminal, since their bottom-up stimulus
strength is weak and they do not receive focused atten-
tion. Dehaene et al. predicted that unattended subliminal
stimuli should produce little or no priming and should
not reliably excite the frontoparietal network necessary
for priming of cognitive control. Our results challenge
this prediction, too.
One important issue will be to determine the depth of
processing of the uncued motion. Previous research has
demonstrated that the presence of cuing effects does not
necessarily demonstrate manipulation of the highest control
center in the brain (Logan & Bundesen, 2003). With this
caveat in mind, what we claim here is that the effect we
observed probably operated via cognitive processes beyond
the early perceptual level. Future studies using brain-
imaging methods (Lau & Passingham, 2007; van Gaal et
al., 2008; van Gaal et al., 2010) will be needed to conclu-
sively resolve this issue.
How does subliminal uncued motion influence task set?
Traditionally, it has been assumed that both conscious per-
ception and executive control functions (e.g., task-set prep-
aration) depend on activity in the prefrontal cortex
(Koechlin et al., 2003; Miller & Cohen, 2001). However,
recent imaging studies (Lau & Passingham, 2007; van Gaal
et al., 2008; van Gaal et al., 2010) have found that executive
functions triggered by unconscious stimuli also activated the
prefrontal cortex. The fact that unconscious stimuli can
access neuronal resources in this region seems to go against
theories that postulate that the prefrontal cortex is critical for
consciousness, such as the global workspace theory
(Dehaene & Naccache, 2001). However, we have recently
argued that, though consciousness may indeed depend on
prefrontal mechanisms, such mechanisms may be specifi-
cally related to perceptual decision making and sensory
metacognition and may be distinct from other prefrontal
mechanisms, such as those that support executive control
functions (Lau & Rosenthal, 2011). Thus, subliminal
uncued motion could be able to access executive control
functions without leading to conscious perception, even
though both may depend on anatomically proximal (but
distinct) regions in the prefrontal cortex.
Interestingly, another line of research has suggested that
unconscious priming is impossible without temporal atten-
tion (Fabre, Lemaire, & Grainger, 2007; Kiefer & Brendel,
2006; Naccache, Blandin, & Dehaene, 2002). This finding
is in apparent contradiction with our findings that uncon-
scious priming is possible without endogenous spatial atten-
tion. However, temporal and spatial attention have
previously been shown to have differential effects on some
forms of priming. In particular, Fabre et al. reported that
temporal attention is needed for categorical but not for rep-
etition priming. On the other hand, other studies have
reported that spatial attention is needed for repetition
priming (Besner et al., 2005; Lachter et al., 2004;
Marzouki et al., 2007). Our paradigm could potentially help
further elucidate the differences between spatial and tempo-
ral attention.
One alternative explanation for the difference between
our study and the previous ones that did not find priming
without attention is that the crucial difference lies in the
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Palermo, 2009) showed that even though such stimuli as
words, letters, or numbers are only able to prime in the
presence of attention (Fabre et al., 2007; Kiefer & Brendel,
2006; Naccache et al., 2002), faces can prime even without
attention. Finkbeiner and Palermo argued that the difference
might lie in the fact that the former stimuli are processed by
evolutionarily newer brain regions that might be more de-
pendent on attention than are the evolutionarily old regions
that process faces. Our motion stimuli are also processed
mainly in evolutionarily old regions of the brain (Striedter,
2005). Another possibility is that motion processing
depends more on the dorsal than on the ventral visual
pathway, while such static stimuli as words show the
reverse pattern of dependence (Mishkin & Ungerleider,
1982). It is likely that attentional processing might be dif-
ferent for the dorsal and ventral pathways. Regardless of the
exact reason for the difference between the present and past
studies, it should be noted that unlike the previous research,
we report priming of cognitive control, which implies that
our stimuli were necessarily processed beyond the primary
sensory areas.
Finally, one critical issue is whether the uncued stimuli in
our experiment received no spatial attention whatsoever. We
do not argue for such a strong position, and do not think that
this issue could be resolved easily at present. The uncued
stimuli were weak and irrelevant to the task, so subjects had
no reason to attend to them. In our control experiments, we
presented stimuli that, unlike natural scenes or faces, re-
quired spatial attention to be identified (Lee et al., 1999;
Li et al., 2002; Reddy, Moradi, & Koch, 2007). At the
uncued locations, subjects could not identify such stimuli
when they had to perform the main task, which suggests that
the subjects could not have deployed a substantial amount of
attentional resources to the uncued locations. Using a sim-
ilar procedure, previous researchers have argued that such
stimuli operated in the “near absence of attention” (Li et al.,
2002). Following this characterization, then, our results
represent a first step in demonstrating the possibility that
subliminal stimuli may influence cognitive control, even
when they are presented at locations that receive a “near
absence” of endogenous spatial attention. A complete theory
of attention and cognitive control should account for how
this could be possible.
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